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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Defendants Kadeem Thomas and Shevaun Browne appeal their convictions for 
bank robbery and related offenses. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 On January 11, 2011, Kevin Fassale and Kadeem Thomas committed an armed 
robbery of Merchants Commercial Bank in St. John, Virgin Islands. They fled in a blue 
SUV, identified by one of the witnesses as belonging to defendant Shevaun Browne. 
Thomas, Browne, and Fassale were all charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) 
and bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)). Thomas and Fassale were also charged 
with using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Fassale pled guilty 
and agreed to testify against Thomas and Browne at trial. 
 During voir dire, the judge asked the potential jurors whether they, a close friend, 
or a relative had ever been involved with the criminal justice system as a defendant, 
witness, or victim. Several prospective jurors raised their placards and explained their 
answer at sidebar, but Juror 93 was not called to sidebar. After the parties exercised their 
peremptory strikes, defense counsel stated he thought Juror 93 had been shot in a 
domestic violence incident. The judge called Juror 93 to sidebar, and brought up the 
question about involvement with the criminal justice system. Juror 93 stated that she had 
raised her placard, but assumed she had been omitted for some reason. The judge said 
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they must have missed her, and asked her to explain her involvement.
1
 She stated her 
sister was stabbed in a domestic violence incident and her nephew committed a domestic 
violence assault, served time in prison, and was no longer incarcerated. Both incidents 
happened years before. The judge asked if she could remain impartial and apply his 
instructions as given, and she replied in the affirmative. 
 Both defendants moved to strike Juror 93 for cause. The judge denied the request. 
They both then asked the judge to use a peremptory strike against her. The court denied 
this request because both defendants had already used all their strikes. The defendants 
offered to withdraw their last strike and use it on Juror 93 instead. The judge denied that 
request, stating he did not allow “backstriking.” Juror 93 ultimately served on the jury 
and the jury convicted on all charges. These timely appeals followed.
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II. 
 Both defendants argue the court erred by denying their motion to strike Juror 93 
for cause. Alternatively, they argue the court erred by denying their request to withdraw a 
strike and use it on her. 
 “We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to strike a juror for 
cause.” United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2012). “The central inquiry 
in the determination whether a juror should be excused for cause is whether the juror 
holds a particular belief or opinion that will ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
                                                 
1
 Defendants assert she deliberately failed to raise her placard, but the District Court 
credited her statement that she put it up. 
2
 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” 
United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)). 
 We see no abuse of discretion. The domestic violence incidents involving Juror 
93’s relatives were not recent and were dissimilar to the bank robbery committed by 
defendants. Additionally, the court asked Juror 93 whether the incidents would affect her 
impartiality or prevent her from properly applying the law. She replied, “Absolutely not.” 
Cf. United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1284 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of 
discretion when court, in a trial for drug distribution, declined to excuse for cause several 
jurors whose relatives had been involved with drugs). Finally, the trial court credited her 
statement that she raised her placard but was overlooked, so she was not deliberately 
withholding information. 
 The defendants also argue the court erred by not allowing them to withdraw their 
final peremptory strike and use it on Juror 93. Trial judges have “ample discretion” over 
how to conduct voir dire. Salamone, 800 F.2d at 1224 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, 
we see no abuse of discretion in generally disallowing “backstrikes.” See United States v. 
Williams, 986 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming refusal to allow a backstrike, 
pursuant to local practice, even though defense counsel was unaware of the unwritten 
practice); United States v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 394, 396-97 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming 
court’s refusal to allow defendant to withdraw strike and use it on a juror he had already 
accepted). Additionally, if the information about Juror 93 came out after trial, defendants 
would not be entitled to relief based on an argument they would have used a peremptory 
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strike on her had they known. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 
U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (requiring a party to show a juror’s answer would have been 
grounds for a for-cause challenge when the juror fails to honestly answer a question 
during voir dire).  
 Considering the ample discretion afforded to district courts over how to conduct 
voir dire, the permissibility of generally barring backstrikes, and the fact that defendants 
had already used all their strikes, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. 
Additionally, the defendants themselves overlooked Juror 93’s initial response to the 
question at issue so, to some extent, they contributed to the late disclosure of her 
information. The circumstances here, including the information about Juror 93’s 
relatives, are not so compelling for us to conclude that the court abused its discretion by 
following its practice prohibiting backstriking. The court was not required to allow 
defendants to withdraw a strike to use on Juror 93. 
III. 
 Browne argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 
conspiracy. “The standard of review is ‘particularly deferential’ when deciding whether a 
jury verdict is based on legally sufficient evidence.” United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 
173, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1998)). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and sustain 
the verdict if any rational juror could have found the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Id. The elements of a conspiracy are: (1) the existence of an 
agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the objective, and 
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(3) an intent on the part of the conspirators to agree. United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 
109, 113 (3d Cir. 1989).  
Co-defendant Fassale testified to the following facts. Fassale, Browne, Thomas, 
and another man met daily over the two weeks prior to the robbery to plan the robbery. 
Fassale, Browne, and Thomas attempted several times to rob the bank, but called it off 
for various reasons – for example, because the bank was closed or too crowded. Browne 
entered the bank to learn its layout and reported back to the other conspirators. Browne 
provided firearms and allowed Thomas and Fassale to use his car for the robbery. They 
shared the proceeds afterwards. 
 Browne argues this testimony is insufficient for a conviction because a conspiracy 
conviction cannot be based solely on the testimony of a co-conspirator and there is no 
evidence corroborating Fassale’s testimony. We disagree. “In view of the frequent 
absence of proof of crime other than the account of a participant, a jury should be 
permitted as a general rule to convict when persuaded of the credibility of the testimony 
of an accomplice.” United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1060 (3d Cir. 1971); see 
also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917) (“[T]here is no absolute rule of 
law preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them.”). 
“There is no requirement that testimony by a co-conspirator fulfilling a plea bargain be 
corroborated by independent evidence.” United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1157 
(5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he uncorroborated testimony of co-conspirators is sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction unless incredible or unsubstantial on its face.” (quotation marks omitted)); 
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United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e will uphold a 
conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice unless his 
testimony is incredible as a matter of law.”). “The jury is entrusted with the responsibility 
of evaluating the witness’s credibility, and uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator 
will sustain a guilty verdict unless, as is not the case here, the testimony is incredible or 
otherwise insubstantial on its face.” Hernandez, 962 F.2d at 1157.3 Accordingly, the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Browne of conspiracy. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of conviction and 
sentence of Browne and Thomas. 
                                                 
3
 In any event, there was corroborating evidence of Browne’s participation in the 
conspiracy: his car was used as the getaway vehicle. Browne presented testimony that he 
would leave the keys in his car so that his friends could use it. A reasonable jury could 
reject that testimony and draw the inference that Browne allowed Fassale and Thomas to 
use his car because he was a co-conspirator. 
